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property that impatience decreases as consumption increases. The model overcomes a serious 
drawback of the existing model, which needs the assumption of increasing impatience. The new 
model is applied to the Japanese economy, which has been mired in a persistent slump since the 
early 1990s, and the hypothesis that a time preference rate shift is the main cause of the slump is 
explored. The estimated time preference rate clearly shows that an upward time preference shift 
of about 2% occurred in Japan.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
   The view that time preference is an amalgamation of various factors, and is therefore 
naturally time-varying, has not been popular among economists since Samuelson (1937) 
introduced a simplified model of a constant time preference rate, which remains dominant even 
today. But the reason for its dominance is not theoretical plausibility but merely its simplicity 
and tractability. Hence, if its simplicity disguises the essential nature of economic phenomena, 
time-variability of time preference deserves consideration. 
   The concept of time-varying time preference has a long history, dating back to the era of 
Böhm-Bawerk (1889) and Fisher (1930). Among recent works, Lawrance (1991) and Becker 
and Mulligan (1997) showed that people do not inherit permanently constant time preference 
rates by nature, and that economic and social factors affect the formation of time preference. 
This means that many shocks can affect and change time preference throughout life. This is not 
merely a theoretical possibility; it can actually be observed. For example, Parkin (1988) 
examined the business cycles in the U.S. explicitly considering time-variability of time 
preference rate and showed that the rate of time preference was as volatile as technology and 
leisure preferences in the U.S. 
   Incorporating endogeneity of time preference, the endogenous time preference model 
originated by Uzawa (1968) has been used in many analyses. However, this model has not 
necessarily been seen as a realistic expression of endogeneity of time preference, since it has a 
serious problem—namely, that the assumption that impatience increases as income or 
consumption increases is necessary. Without this assumption, the model is unstable. Many 
empirical researchers conclude that the rate of time preference negatively correlates with 
permanent income.
1 Hence, the necessity of assuming increasing impatience seems fatal. 
Exceptionally, Epstein (1987) asserted the plausibility of increasing impatience offering some 
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counter-arguments, however his view is a minority one, and many economists support 
arguments in favor of the decreasing time preference rate. Hence, although the Uzawa model 
attracted attention from some economists such as Epstein and Hynes (1983), Lucas and Stokey 
(1984), and Obstfeld (1990), analysis focusing on endogeneity of time preference has barely 
progressed. However, the skepticism engendered by the endogenous time preference model 
does not necessarily mean that the conjecture that time preference is influenced by future 
consumption is also false. Rather, this conjecture seems to be widely accepted. The problem is 
that a desirable endogenous time preference model, where the rate of time preference negatively 
correlates with income or consumption, has not been presented. Such a model would be more 
favorable and realistic and provide deeper insights into many economic phenomena.   
   The theoretical purpose of this paper is to pursue such a realistic endogenous time 
preference model. The problem of assuming increasing impatience arises in the specification 
that distant future consumption or utilities have little influence on the factor that forms the rate 
of time preference. However, this specification seems inadequate as a specification of “the size 
of utility stream” that, Fisher (1930) asserted, has a considerable influence on the formation of 
the rate of time preference. Instead, a simple measure—where the entire utilities, from the 
present to the distant future, are summed up with equal weight—could be a more realistic 
measure of “the size of utility stream,” and incorporating this measure will make models of 
endogenous time preference more appropriate. Given the definition of “the size of utility 
stream” as such, a new, realistic and stable endogenous time preference model with the feature 
of decreasing impatience can be deduced. Being able to assume decreasing impatience without 
making an economy unstable is a remarkable result. A stable endogenous time preference model 
that successfully incorporates the assumption of decreasing impatience may open the road to 
new approaches. 
      Subjective interest in this paper is the economic slump in Japan. The Japanese economy, the 
second largest in the world, has been mired in a persistent slump since the beginning of the  3
1990s, while other industrialized economies have enjoyed steady growth. This slump arrived on 
the heels of the high rate of growth that Japan enjoyed during the second half of the 1980s. As 
Figure 1 shows, the GDP of Japan has been nearly flat since the early 1990s. The average real 
GDP growth rate was a mere 1.3% annually in the 1990s, compared with 4.0% in the 1980s. 
The big question is what caused this protracted slump, which is peculiar to Japan among the 
industrialized economies. Many researchers have tried to answer that, but no consensus has 
been formed on the main causes behind the slump.   
   The new endogenous time preference model in this paper predicts that when uncertainty 
over the future economy increases, the rate of time preference shifts upwards and long-lasting 
negative impacts will hit the economy because the time preference shift moves the steady state 
to a lower level. Hence, a time preference shift is a possible cause of the slump in Japan.   
      Empirical results show that the time preference rate of the Japanese in the second half of the 
1980s, when Japan enjoyed the benefits of the so-called bubble economy, was unquestionably 
lower than it has been since the beginning of the 1990s, and the uncertainty represented by the 
volatility of equity prices shifted upward exactly in the same period when the time preference 
shifted. The results strongly support the hypothesis that the time preference rate shifted upward 
in the late 1980s in Japan triggered by an increase of uncertainty and that it is the principal 
cause of the protracted slump in Japan. 
   Of course, this coincidence of movements does not prove the hypothesis that the slump in 
Japan was caused by an upward time preference shift. Many other possibilities that generate the 
coincidence of movements need to be examined to assert more definite conclusions. However, 
the episode of the Japanese economy is so well fitted to the predicted consequence of an upward 
time preference shift that its implications seem worth pursuing. 
   This paper is organized as follows. Section I presents a new kind of endogenous time 
preference model, one that overcomes the serious shortcoming in the existing endogenous time 
preference model, and then shows that shifts of uncertainty cause the rate of time preference to  4
shift. In Section II, the hypothesis that a time preference shift induced by an uncertainty shift 
could be the cause of Japan’s stagnation is presented, and the hypothesis is examined as an 
application of the new endogenous time preference model. Estimates of the time series of the 
time preference rate and uncertainty in Japan during the 1980s and the 1990s show their 
coincidental upward shifts in the late 1980s, and that conforms to the above hypothesis. In 
Section III, some concluding remarks are offered. 
 
I. A MORE REALISTIC ENDOGENOUS TIME PREFERENCE MODEL 
   The well-known endogenous time preference model of Uzawa (1968) has attracted 
considerable attention among economists and has been used in many economic studies. The 
basic feature of the Uzawa model is: 
 
(1)   θ(u(c)) > 0,    θ’ > 0,    u’ > 0. 
 
The rate of time preference θ is an increasing function of present utility u(c), which is an 
increasing function of present consumption c. However, the Uzawa model has a serious 
drawback. The assumption θ’ > 0 is a necessary condition for stability but is quite controversial 
and difficult to accept a priori. This unnatural but indispensable assumption makes many 
economists critical of the endogenous time preference model, so there follows a re-examination 
of this shortcoming and a new model that overcomes it. 
 
(a) Size effect on impatience 
   The problem of the assumption θ’ > 0 arises in the specification that distant future utilities 
has little influence on the factor that forms the rate of time preference. In this kind of 
specification, the rate of time preference must be revised every period in accordance with 
growth of consumption. However, there is no a priori reason why information on distant future  5
activities should be far less important than information on present and near future activities. 
How information on present and distant future activities is used for the formation of time 
preference must be explored in terms of people’s response to information regarding the motif 
that forms impatience. Concerning this response, Fisher (1930) asserted in Section 6, “The 
influence of mere size,” that “[I]n general, it may be said that, other things being equal, the 
smaller the income, the higher the preference for present over future income. It is true of course 
that a permanently small income implies a keen appreciation of wants as well as of immediate 
wants. … But it increases the want for immediate income even more than it increases the want 
for future income.” According to Fisher’s view, a force that influences time preference is a 
psychological response derived from the perception of the “size of entire income or utility 
stream.” Hence, it is necessary to probe how people perceive the “size of entire income or utility 
stream”—namely, how people judge which is bigger among utility streams that have different 
shapes and continue on infinitely. 
   Behind the formation of time preference there will be a unique psychological or emotional 
response to the size of entire utility stream, which is a different kind of response from the mere 
discounted sum of pleasures derived from consuming goods. Hence, an approach from 
psychological researches may shed light on the size effect. However, little effort has been 
directed towards probing the effect that the nature of the size of utility or income stream has on 
time preference, although a large number of various psychological experiments pertaining to 
anomalies of the expected utility model with a constant time preference rate have been made.
2 
Turning to researches in economics, analyses using the endogenous time preference model have 
so far merely introduced an a priori assumption of endogeneity of time preference without 
explaining its reasoning in detail. 
   Hence, Fisher’s insights are still very useful for an examination of the size effect. An 
important remark in Fisher (1930) quoted above is that the size of infinite utility stream is 
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perceived by anticipating whether the entire utility stream is “permanently” high or low. It may 
be interpreted that the difference in size among utility streams is perceived by the permanently 
continuing difference of utilities among different utility streams. If so, the distant future utilities 
should be taken into account equally with the present utility, otherwise it is impossible to 
distinguish whether the difference in utilities continues permanently. 
   Furthermore, it seems likely that anticipating the “permanently” higher utility may enhance 
the emotion of being guaranteed since guarantee means a “long persisting” secured situation and 
embodies “continuity,” and it will make people more patient—that is, a strengthened emotion of 
being guaranteed may generate a positive psychological response and thus decrease the rate of 
time preference. If a person expects that her future success is guaranteed by continuing to follow 
her current way of working, she will be motivated and discipline herself, and then be less 
impatient from the beginning.
3  On the other hand, if a person expects that she will not attain her 
objectives, she will give up disciplining herself and become more impatient. Thus it seems 
likely that the size of entire utility stream that affects impatience is closely related with the 
emotion of being guaranteed. The emotion of being guaranteed is a completely different kind of 
psychological response from the discounted sum of utilities from consumption. If anything, it is 
an emotion derived from anticipating a “continuity” of pleasure or utility from the present to the 
distant future. The key factor of this emotion is “continuity.” 
      From this point of view, the specification that only current utility influences the formation of 
time preference, as is the case with the existing endogenous time preference model, may be 
inadequate as a specification of “the size of utility stream.” Rather, a simple measure of 
size—where entire utilities from the present to the distant future are summed up with equal 
weight—could be a measure that satisfies the abovementioned criterion, and incorporating this 
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measure will make models of endogenous time preference more appropriate.   
 
(b) Model 
      Taking the above arguments into account, the “size” of infinite utility stream is defined here 
as follows. 
 
Definition: The “size” of a utility stream W is   
    () ( ) [] ∫ ∞ → =
T
t T dt, c u E t w W
0 0 lim  
where w(t) =
T
1  if 0 ≤ t ≤ T otherwise w(t) = 0, and u(ct) [0,∞) is utility for consumption ct in 
period t. 
 
Et denotes expectations conditional on information available in the period t. w(t) are weights and 
have the same value in any period. Thus the weights for evaluation of future utilities are 
distributed evenly over time, as suggested above. Next, the effect of the size on the formation of 
the rate of time preference as well as utility and production functions is assumed as follows. 
 
Assumption: 
  (A.1) The aggregated time preference rate function θ(W) from R to R+ is continuous and 
continuously differentiable. 
  (A.2) 0 <
dW
dθ . 
  (A.3)  The  utility  function  u(c) of the representative consumer from R+ to R is continuous for 
c ≥ 0 and twice continuously differentiable for c > 0. 
  (A.4) 0 >
dc
du .  8
  (A.5) The production function f(x,  rs) of the representative firm from R+  × S to R+ is 
stochastic, continuous for x ≥ 0, and continuously differentiable for x > 0 and f(0, rs) = 0, where 
S = [α, β] (0 < α < β < 0). x is a factor input and rs is random shock in per capita (equal to per 
worker) terms. 
 
The natural and acceptable feature θ’ < 0 ( 0 <
dW
dθ ) is assumed in (A.2). However, for this 
assumption to be justified, stability needs to be achieved. To see this, it first needs to be shown 
that the size defined above possesses the following two important features: first, the rate of time 
preference is determined by the utility at steady state; and second, the rate of time preference is 
constant unless an unanticipated permanent fundamental shock is given and thus the 
optimization problem needs to be solved again. 
 
Proposition 1: If lim t→∞ E0(u(ct)) = E0(u(c*)), where c* is the consumption at steady state, then 
  (i)  W = E0(u(c*)), 
    (ii) The rate of time preference is constant unless a shock that changes the distribution of the 
steady state consumption and/or utility function is anticipated. 
Proof:  
  (i)  Since  lim t→∞ E0(u(ct)) = E0(u(c*)) and w(t) =
T
1  if  0  ≤ t ≤ T otherwise w(t) = 0, then 
     () () [] () [] { } . dt c u E c u E t w
T
t T 0 lim
0 0
*
0 = − ∫ ∞ →  
Moreover,  
     () () [] () [] { } ( ) [ ] . W c u E dt c u E c u E t w
T




0 = − = − ∫ ∞ →  
Hence, W = E0(u(c*)). 
  (ii) It is self-evident by (i). If a shock that changes the distribution of the steady state  9
consumption and/or utility function is not anticipated, W, which does not depend on t but on c* 
and u, does not change in any period, thus the rate of time preference is constant.                  ■ 
 
   Hence, the utility at steady state determines the rate of time preference and the rate of time 
preference continues to be constant until an unanticipated permanent fundamental shock hits the 
economy. Endogeneity of time preference only matters when such a shock occurs. This feature 
is intuitively acceptable since it is likely that people set their principles or parameters for 
behavior while considering the final consequences—that is, the steady state. 
   The result of constancy yields an important feature—namely, it allows the conventional 
stochastic general equilibrium model with a constant time preference rate to be applied without 
any modification, since each optimization in the general equilibrium model is based on 
conditional expectations and thus, once a constant time preference rate is determined, 
endogeneity no longer matters. The feature of constancy makes analysis based upon the model 
in this paper simple and tractable, while endogeneity of time preference is retained. 
      According to the Proposition 1, the model of endogenous time preference newly specified is 
expressed as 
 
(2)   θ(W),  W = E0(u(c*)),   0 <
dW




This model is deceptively similar to the original Uzawa endogenous time preference model, 
with the simple replacing of c by c* and θ’ > 0 by θ’ < 0. However, the characteristics of the 
two models are completely different. The most important difference is that the new model (2) 
with the feature θ’ < 0 is stable. This is demonstrated as follows. 
      Here, the following conventional one-good Ramsey model is assumed. The expected utility, 
  10




0 1   
 
is maximized, subject to the constraint, 
 
     ()
dt
dx
c ,rs x f
t
t t + =   ,  
 
where  xt,  rs, and ct are in per capita (equal to per worker) terms and the growth rate of 
population is zero. 
   In this framework, if a constant time preference rate is given, then the marginal product of 
capital—that is, the real interest rate in a decentralized economy—converges to the given time 
preference rate as an economy approaches the steady state. Hence, when a time preference rate 
is given at a certain value, the corresponding expected steady state consumption is uniquely 
determined, where the real interest rate equals the given time preference rate. Given that other 
exogenous parameters are fixed, any predetermined rate of time preference has its unique value 
of the expected consumption as well as the expected utility at steady state. The expected utility 
at steady state thus can be expressed as a function of the rate of time preference because there is 
a one-to-one correspondence between the expected utility at steady state and the rate of time 
preference. This is a basic consequence of the conventional Ramsey model. Let C* be a set of 
steady state consumptions, given a set of time preference rates Θ and with other exogenous 
parameters fixed. The above function is defined as g(θ) = E0(u(c*)): R+→R where c* ∈ C* and 
θ ∈Θ, and it is shown in Figure 2. 
   On the other hand, the rate of time preference θ is a continuous function of the steady state 
consumption c* as shown in the model (2): θ(W) and W = E0(u(c*)). This is the basic feature of 
endogeneity of time preference; the expected future utilities have an influence on the formation  11
of the rate of time preference. Redefine the functions θ(W) and W = E0(u(c*)) as a function: 
h
R[E0(u(c*))] = θ: R→R+. Its reversed function is h(θ) = E0(u(c*)): R+→R, and it is shown in 
Figure 2.   
   Hence, the equilibrium time preference rate in the model is determined by the point of 
intersection of two functions—g(θ) and h(θ), as shown in Figure 2—where both the basic 
consequence of the conventional Ramsey model and the basic feature of endogeneity of time 
preference are simultaneously held. The function h(θ) = E0(u(c*)) = W is a decreasing function 
of θ by the definition (A.2). The function g(θ) = E0(u(c*)) = W is also a decreasing function of θ, 
since the higher rate of time preference induces the lower steady state consumption. Panel (b) 
and (c) of Figure 2 show two cases of the decreasing function g(θ), while panel (a) of Figure 2 
shows the ordinarily used permanently constant time preference rate. 
      The existence of this point of intersection is important for stability. An economy is stable if 
such a point of intersection exists and the rate of time preference is determined at that point, 
since, once the rate of time preference corresponding to the intersection, which is constant 
unless there are unanticipated permanent fundamental shocks, is determined, the model can be 
treated as a model with a constant time preference rate after that. As was mentioned above, 
endogeneity of time preference only matters when unanticipated permanent fundamental shocks 
occur. Conditions for the existence of a point of intersection are as follows. 
 
Lemma: g(θ) is continuous for θ > 0. 
Proof: As a result of maximization in the model, c*(rs) = f(x*, rs) and θ = f ’(x*, rs), where x* 
is the factor input at steady state and rs is the random shock introduced in the assumption (A.5). 
Since f(x*, rs) and f ’(x*, rs) are continuous for x* > 0 by the assumption (A.5), c*(rs) is a 
continuous function of θ: R+→R+ for θ > 0. Here, since u is continuous by the assumption 
(A.3), thus E0(u(c*)) = g(θ) is also continuous for θ >   0 .                              ■ 
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Proposition 2: Let D(θ) = h(θ) − g(θ). If lim θ→∞ D(θ) < 0 and lim θ→0 D(θ) > 0, or if lim θ→∞ 
D(θ) > 0 and lim θ→0 D(θ) < 0, then an equilibrium time preference rate such as D(θ) = 0 exists. 
Proof: h(θ) is continuous by the assumption (A.1) and g(θ) is continuous for θ > 0 by the 
Lemma, thus D(θ) = h(θ) − g(θ) is also continuous for θ > 0. Hence, by the intermediate value 
theorem, there exists a certain θ that makes D(θ)   =   0 .                †             ■ 
 
Hence the point of intersection of the two functions g(θ) and h(θ) can exist, and thus the 
assumption θ’ < 0 adopted in the model does not necessarily cause instability in the model. This 
is because the tiresome problem of too little influence of the distant future, which inevitably 
generates the unjustifiable feature θ’ > 0, no longer exists. Being able to assume θ’ < 0 without 
making an economy unstable is a remarkable result. Although endogeneity of time preference is 
intuitively acceptable, so far the necessity of the no-more-compelling assumption θ’ > 0 has 
obstructed further researches in view of endogenous time preference, and many economists 
have been profoundly skeptical of models having this feature. Hence the stable endogenous time 
preference model successfully incorporating the assumption θ’ < 0 in this paper may open the 
road to new approaches. 
   To sum up, as a reasonable result of a re-examination of Fisher’s insights, a model can be 
deduced that possesses intuitively acceptable features such that, (1) the usually constant rate of 
time preference shifts occasionally in response to unanticipated permanent fundamental shocks, 
and (2) higher expected future consumption decreases impatience. 
 
(c) Effect of uncertainty 
   One important feature of the new model is that, in addition to shocks on technology or 
leisure preference, shocks on uncertainty make the rate of time preference shift. This is not a 
new finding. Fisher (1930) pointed out that uncertainty, or risk, must naturally have an influence 
on the rate of time preference and that higher uncertainty tends to raise the rate of time  13
preference. The influence of uncertainty can be understood as follows.   
   In general, the uncertainty about c* can be represented by stochastic dominance of the 
expected distribution of consumption at steady state in a second degree sense, or the 
Roschild-Stigliz sense. Given F(c*), a subjective cumulative distribution function of c*(0 ≤ a < 
c* < b), the size W is   
 
(3)   () [] () ( ) ∫ = =
b




Consider two steady state consumptions c*1 and c*2. When u(c*) is increasing and concave in 
c*, then E0(u(c*2)) ≤ E0(u(c*1)) if F(c*1) second degree stochastically dominates F(c*2) with 
strict inequality for a set of values of c* with positive probability. If F(c*1) stochastically 
dominates F(c*2) in the Roschild-Stigliz sense, then E0(u(c*2)) ≤ E0(u(c*1)) and the mean of 
consumption is preserved as well. Thus, if the uncertainty about the steady state consumption 
increases from F(c*1) to F(c*2) in these senses, the size of entire utility stream W = E0(u(c*)) 
basically decreases.
4 
   The effects of the change in uncertainty regarding the steady state consumption can be 
understood heuristically by Figure 2. When a shock occurs to the subjective cumulative 
distribution, which makes the uncertainty increase for any θ, all the future endogenous variables 
should be immediately recalculated. If the utility is increasing and concave, this increase of the 
uncertainty generally means a shift of the locus g(θ) = W in Figure 2 downward to the dashed 
line, since W = E0(u(c*)) becomes smaller for any θ. In the case of the ordinarily used 
permanently constant time preference rate shown in panel (a), the increase of the uncertainty 
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have different meanings. However, here I give the term “uncertainty” the same meaning as that described above; it 
has roughly the same meaning as risk.  14
decreases  W but has no effect on θ  and thus the rate of time preference does not change. 
However, if the rate of time preference is sensitive to W as in panel (b), the equilibrium time 
preference rate increases. On the other hand, if the rate of time preference is much more 
sensitive to W, as in panel (c), the equilibrium time preference rate decreases in reverse. Thus 
the direction of the effect depends on the relative steepness of the slopes of g(θ) = W and h(θ) = 
W. 
   Hence, in this model, an abrupt shift of time preference influenced by an abrupt change of 
anticipation of uncertainty is theoretically possible in the stochastic general equilibrium 
framework. As a result, uncertainty can affect steady states through the channel of shifts of time 
preference. 
   Which is more general, panel (b) or panel (c)? That is an empirical question. However, 
considering the usually accepted notion that panel (a) can be used as an approximation in many 
cases, the relatively steep slope of h(θ) = W locus as shown in panel (b) may be more generally 
observed. Hence, generally an increase in uncertainty may raise the rate of time preference. 
      On the whole, the model in this paper has characteristics regarding the effects of the size of 
and uncertainty about anticipated future consumption that are generally the same as those Fisher 
(1930) asserted; it therefore appears to reflect Fisher’s notion with greater fidelity. That is, the 
endogenous time preference model in this paper appears to be much more realistic than the 
existing one.   
 
II. APPLYING THE NEW MODEL TO THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 
   The new endogenous time preference model in this paper predicts that when uncertainty 
about the future economy increases, the rate of time preference shifts upwards and then, as a 
consequence, long-lasting negative impacts will hit the economy because the shift of time 
preference rate moves the steady state to a lower level. The recent protracted slump of the 
Japanese economy may be a good example of an upward time preference shift. The Japanese  15
economy, the second largest in the world, has been mired in a persistent slump since the 
beginning of the 1990s, while other industrialized economies have enjoyed steady growth in the 
1990s; and this decline came on the heels of Japan’s high rate of growth during the second half 
of the 1980s. At the same time, several surveys have showed that uncertainty and anxiety about 
the future economy have increased significantly in Japan since the early 1990s.
5 In general, 
uncertainty is thought to be irrelevant vis-a-vis output fluctuations, since the uncertainty 
equivalence seems to hold in general.
6 However, as shown in Section I, the new endogenous 
time preference model presents a new mechanism showing the link between uncertainty and real 
economic activities.
7 Hence if coincident increases of the rate of time preference and 
uncertainty are observed in Japan, it will provide evidence in favor of the hypothesis that the 
slump in Japan was generated by the mechanism of endogenous time preference explained in 
this paper. 
 
(a) Existing explanations of the slump in Japan   
   Although many reasons have been presented to explain Japan’s persistent slump since the 
early 1990s following the big boom of the 1980s, none seems satisfactory. International shocks 
such as a sharp rise in oil prices are insufficient because only Japan among the industrialized 
                                                           
5  See e.g. The Bank of Japan, “Questionnaires on consumer sentiment,” Annual report. 
6 Even models incorporating precautionary saving cannot reconcile this inference. For example, Gourinchas and 
Parker (2001) stated that “[t]he recent poor macroeconomic performance of Japan is often blamed on high perceived 
uncertainty about the future and the associated lower consumption demand. ... In a standard one-good model, 
precautionary saving need not deliver such an outcome, as higher uncertainty leads to either higher investment or a 
current-account surplus and, hence, no obvious need for an output decline. The empirical relevance of this 
explanation should be tested, and its applicability may well be broader than the Japanese slump.” 
7  Romer (1990) contended that uncertainty aggravated the Great Depression—that is, the collapse of stock prices in 
October 1929 generated temporary uncertainty about future income, which led consumers to forgo purchases of 
durable goods.  16
economies experienced a severe slump during the 1990s, and no other Japan-specific huge 
external shocks have been detected. Most explanations attribute the slump to several different 
domestic factors. Shiller, Kon-Ya, and Tsutsui (1996) admitted that they could not find an 
unambiguous explanation of the Nikkei stock crash, although they suggested that it was related 
to changes in expectations. Krugman (1998), McKinnon and Ohno (2000), and Svensson (2001) 
asserted that Japan was mired in a “liquidity trap.” Bayoumi (1999) and Ramaswamy and 
Rendu (1999) used VARs to identify the driving force of the slump in the 1990s, and Bayoumi 
concluded that the principal cause was disruption in financial intermediaries, while Ramaswamy 
and Rendu concluded it was large negative shocks to investment. Motonishi and Yoshikawa 
(1999) pointed to weak investment due to low profitability and a credit crunch as the cause of 
stagnation in the 1990s. Meltzer (2000) suggested that the recession in the early 1990s was 
induced by a decline in money and the recession in recent years was induced mainly by a fall in 
real exports. There are various other explanations, depending on which factors are selected and 
stressed. However, there is no consensus on what caused persistence of the slump. The problem 
with many of these explanations is that they cannot identify the origin of the shock among deep 
parameters. 
      The steady state in Japan likely moved abruptly to a far lower level, which may make all the 
phenomena consistently explainable. However, what kind of shock could generate such a huge 
shift of the steady state? The primary suspect among deep parameters may be technology. 
However, few economists insist that a technology shock is the main source of Japan’s 
stagnation. Exceptionally, Hayashi and Prescott (2002) attributed the stagnation in Japan to low 
productivity growth. However, estimation of TFP needs careful scrutiny.
8 Furthermore, a clear 
theoretical reason why productivity growth fell abruptly and has continued low over 10 years is 
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Japan. The Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry asserts that the productivity in Japan is estimated to 
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not presented in Hayashi and Prescott (2002), and they admit that it remains a puzzle. It is hard 
to find specific obstacles that have abruptly prevented Japan from utilizing world technologies 
since the early 1990s, given the fact that Japan had achieved huge success through world 
technologies prior to 1990. A leisure preference shock is another candidate but this has not been 
reported, perhaps because, although leisure preference shocks imply that a recession is caused 
by a strengthened unwillingness of workers to work longer, it seems unlikely that such a 
situation occurred in Japan, where an unprecedented number of workers were forced to leave 
their jobs. Explanations based on indeterminacy or multiple-equilibria theories are also possible, 
though these have not been presented as yet, perhaps because it is difficult to apply those 
theories practically to the experience of the Japanese economy. 
   Contrary to the above explanations, stories based on a monetary policy shock such as 
Meltzer (2000) have drawn attention. Some believe that the dramatic tightening of monetary 
policy in 1989 to curb the continuing “unreasonable” rise of land prices caused the recession 
and that the monetary policy following that continued to be too tight. It can be argued whether 
the unprecedented monetary policy of the Bank of Japan of keeping the short-term nominal 
interest rate at nearly zero since the mid-90s is still “too tight.” More importantly, a specific 
monetary transmission mechanism capable of generating such a huge negative impact on real 
variables continuing over 10 years, despite a desperate monetary policy of near zero interest 
rates, has not been identified. Without an understanding of this mechanism, a monetary policy 
shock does not seem to fully explain Japan’s stagnation. 
      Japan’s stagnation since the early 1990s is evidently still a mystery and remains a challenge 
for economists. Solving this puzzle requires consideration of a few other deep parameters—such 
as the rate of time preference and uncertainty—that are not usually considered driving forces of 
economic fluctuations. The endogenous time preference model newly developed in this paper 
suggests the possibility that the time preference rate in Japan shifted upward. If such an upward 
shift can be detected, the situation in the recent Japanese economy may provide evidence in  18
favor of the mechanism of endogenous time preference explained in this paper.   
 
(b) Characteristics of shifts of time preference 
      A shift of the rate of time preference seems to have the characteristics needed to explain the 
stagnant Japanese economy, as it changes the steady state. Even a small change of the rate of 
time preference will have significant and permanent effects on economic activities and has 
sufficient power to turn the tide. As shown in Figure 3, the steady state in the phase diagram of 
the dynamics of the conventional Ramsey model is the point of intersection of the vertical line 
0 =
dt
dct  and the locus 0 =
dt
dkt , where ct and kt are the per capita consumption and capital, 
respectively, in the period t. If an economy is at the steady state and then the rate of time 
preference goes up, the vertical line  0 =
dt
dct  moves to a lower labor-capital ratio, thus 
production and consumption eventually decrease to the new steady state, and the business is 
depressed, and vice versa.
9 If there is an upward trend in output owing to positive technology 
shocks, what otherwise may be a severe output decrease when the rate of time preference rises, 
may instead show up as a lowered growth rate. This movement coincides with Japan’s abrupt 
plunging into recession at the beginning of the 1990s and the persistent slump since then, 
indicating that a shift in the time preference rate may better explain the recent unusual 
experience of the Japanese economy. 
 
(c) Empirical results 
   In this subsection, the model presented above is applied to the Japanese economy and the 
possibility of the time preference shift in Japan is examined. First, the time-series of the time 
                                                           
9 Certainly, if an economy is not at steady state but on a transition path when time preference shifts, the change of 
economic course may be different. This is not the case only with time preference shifts but is the same in other 
shocks that change steady states.  19
preference rate of the Japanese during this period is estimated, and then, using the estimated 
series, a break point is checked for in the time preference rate. Second, the uncertainty is 
estimated and checked for its break point. Finally, the break points of the time preference, 
uncertainty, and output are examined. 
 
1) Estimation of the time preference rate 
   As  shown  in  subsection  I(b), the framework of the endogenous time preference model in this 
paper is the conventional Ramsey model and the rate of time preference continues to be constant 
until an unanticipated permanent fundamental shock hits an economy. Thus, the time preference 
rate in Japan is estimated using the Euler equation: 
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where rt is the long-term nominal interest rate, nt is the population growth rate, and E(pt) is the 
expected inflation rate. The time series of the time preference rate in Japan is calculated from 
the following equation, which is simply derived from equation (4), supposing that σ(ct) is 
constant. 
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where θ*t is the estimated time series of the time preference rate and et is random noise. The  20
estimated time series of the time preference rate θ*t contains the random noise et; thus it is a 
kind of “residuals,” as is usually the case with estimated total factor productivity. 
   The four-quarter inflation rate is the assumed proxy for the expected inflation rate. As for 
consumer intention regarding the real consumption change, the intention to change consumption 
at a certain time is assumed to be found in the realized consumption change from that time to a 
year later.
10 Although many estimated values of σ exist, the simplest value σ = 1 is used and 
thus utility is assumed to be logarithmic. The data used for the estimation are quarterly series of 
the per capita real consumption, GDP deflator, and 10-year government bond yield.
11 
   It is clear from the result shown in Figure 4 that the time preference rate in the second half 
of the 1980s, when Japan enjoyed the benefits of the so-called bubble-economy, was 
unquestionably lower than it has been since the early 1990s.
12  This result strongly supports the 
hypothesis that the time preference rate shifted upward in the late 1980s. 
      Large temporary fluctuations of the time preference rate are estimated for the periods of the 
early 1980s and around 1997. The former seems to be influenced largely by the second oil crisis 
and the following well-known monetary policy regime change, and the latter by the well-known 
overreaction to the consumption tax hike in 1997. It is likely that some assumptions of this 
                                                           
10 This assumption seems acceptable since changes of the consumer’s intention concerning consumption may need 
some lags to materialize and be accomplished in the following several quarters. 
11  Data of the real consumption and the GDP deflator are those from the National Accounts released by the Japanese 
government. Data of population are those released by the Japanese government. Data of the 10-year government bond 
yield are those published by the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Data of the real consumption in 68SNA are used, since data 
of the 1980s in 93SNA were estimated by a simple method and are less accurate. GDP deflator data are adjusted 
corresponding to the effect of introducing the consumption tax in April 1989 and the rate raise in April 1997. 
12  In some periods, the estimated time preference rates indicate negative, however, this partly reflects a positive trend 
of the consumption that lowers the scale of the estimated rates of time preference. During the period, the growth rate 
of the log linear trend of the real consumption is 2.5%; hence, the time preference rate would actually be 2.5% higher 
than the estimated value in every period and thus be positive throughout the period.  21
estimation method are temporarily unsatisfied in those periods—that is, the assumption of 
expectation formation of the inflation rate for the former period and the assumption of the 
optimal behavior of consumers for the latter period. However, during the period between the 
mid-1980s and mid-90s, there was fortunately no such big temporary shock that may have 
invalidated some of the assumptions, and the estimated values are stable during this period 
except for a presumed shift. Hence, I will concentrate on this period.   
      That the time preference rate in the 1990s was about 2% higher than that in the second half 
of the 1980s is apparent from looking at Figure 4. Next, sequential trend break tests were 
conducted to discover the exact date of the shift. In accordance with Perron (1997) and 
Ben-David and Pappel (1998), the following form is first regressed for unit root tests. 
 
(7)   ( ) ∑ = − − + + + + + + + =
q
j t j t j t b t t t , ε ∆y κ y η T νD ξDT χDU t τ ∆y
1 1 ϕ  
 
where yt is the series concerned, ∆yt is the first difference, and the break dummy variables have 
the following values when time of the break is TB: DUt = 1 if t > TB, 0 otherwise; DTt = t − TB 
if  t  >  TB, 0 otherwise; D(Tb) = 1 if t = TB + 1, 0 otherwise. Equation (7) is estimated 
sequentially from TB = 2, ... ,T-1, where T is the number of the observation. Time of the break is 
selected by choosing the value TB for which the absolute value of the t-statistic for η is 
maximized. Lag length is selected by the procedure suggested by Ng and Perron (1995) and 
Ben-David and Pappel (1998), such that starting with an upper bound of jmax on j, if the last lag 
included in equation (7) is significant, then the choice of j is jmax; and if the lag is not significant, 
then q is reduced by 1. jmax is initially set at 8 for quarter series and 24 for monthly series. The 
null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected if the t-statistic for η is greater than the critical values 
that Perron (1997) provided for this lag length selection method.     
   Next, trend break tests based on Vogelsang (1997) and Ben-David and Pappel (1998) are 
performed. The tests are carried out by estimating the following equation:  22
 
(8)   ∑ = − + + + + + =
q
j t j t j t t t ε y κ ξDT χDU t τ y
1 ϕ  
 
and if a series contains a unit root, by the following equation, as suggested by Vogelsang 
(1997): 
 
(9)   ∑ = − + + + =
q
j t j t j t t ε ∆y κ χDU τ ∆y
1  
 
These equations are estimated sequentially for each break date. The sup-Wald test, using 
sequentially estimated Wald-statistics for the null hypothesis χ = ξ = 0, provides the date of the 
shift.
13  This test is applied to the probable trend break during the late 1980s.
14 
   The results are summarized in the Table. According to the sup-Wald test, the date of the 
shift was the fourth quarter of 1989.
15 During the estimated period, the difference of the 
average time preference rate between before the trend break and after is 2.3%—that is, the time 
preference rate shifted up 2.3 percentage points.   
 
2) Estimation of the uncertainty 
   To investigate the shift in the uncertainty, an appropriate proxy of the uncertainty over 
consumption at steady state is necessary. Stock prices are the obvious first choice. Since stock 
                                                           
13  As for the critical values reported in Vogelsang (1997), the values for only two cases of the trimming parameter λ* 
= 0.01 and λ* = 0.15 are listed. Hence the stricter case of λ* = 0.01 was applied for the tests in this paper. 
14  As for the test period on the probable break in the late 1980s, the start date was set as the first quarter of 1986 and 
the final date is the fourth quarter of 1995. The reasoning of this choice is that the data of the early 1980s seems 
highly contaminated by the second oil crisis and the following well-known monetary policy regime change, and the 
data around 1997 are contaminated by the overreaction to the consumption tax rise, as mentioned above. 
15  The null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at the 1% level. The tests are performed by equation (8) without trend.  23
prices are formed by an evaluation of the future value of firms that reflects aspects of the future 
economic environment, volatility of stock prices can be seen as a general measure of future 
uncertainty. Many empirical researchers used stock market data as an uncertainty proxy. For 
example, Romer (1990) used stock price volatility as a proxy of the uncertainty about the future 
income for empirical research on the Great Depression. Thus, this paper uses the volatility of 
TOPIX (a broad composite stock price index released by the Tokyo Stock Exchange) as the 
proxy of the uncertainty. Estimation is based on a simple diffusion type model: 
 





+1     ε ~ (0, υ
2) 
 
where St is the stock price at the working day t and ς is a drift.
16 The  volatility  υ for each month 
is estimated on the assumption that ς and υ are constant during a month. 
   Results are shown in Figure 5. Clearly the volatility of TOPIX since the early 1990s is 
higher than that before 1990. The average monthly standard deviation of TOPIX in the 1980s is 
0.0063, and since the early 1990s it has doubled to 0.0118. This fact suggests plausibility of the 
hypothesis of this paper that the uncertainty increased in the 1990s and it raised the time 
preference rate.   
      To know the exact date of the shift, the same trend break test as in the time preference rate is 
performed.
17 According to the result of the sup-Wald test, the date of the shift was December 
1989, as shown in the Table. This is exactly the same period when the time preference shifted. 
                                                           
16 Campbell and Lettau (1999) noted that multivariate volatility models are notoriously complicated and difficult to 
estimate, and the choice of a parametric model is less important for describing historical movements in volatility 
because all models tend to produce historical fitted volatilities that move closely together. 
17  The null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at the 1% level. The tests are performed by equation (8) without trend. 
It is estimated sequentially for each break month with 1% trimming.  24
This coincidence further strengthens plausibility of the hypothesis that the time preference rate 
shifted upward triggered by an increase of the uncertainty. The date of the trend break, 
December 1989, is also coincident with the date of the peak of the unprecedentedly high stock 
prices that collapsed the following month. 
 
3) Trend break test of the growth rate of the output 
   As shown in the introduction, the growth rate of the output in Japan since the early 1990s 
has been very different from the 1980s. To explore the relation among the output, time 
preference, and uncertainty, the same trend break test is applied to the output (logarithms of the 
per capita real GDP).
18  According to the results shown in the Table, the date of the trend break 
in the growth rate of the output was during the third quarter of 1990. This is three quarters after 
the shifts of the time preference rate and uncertainty. This lag length seems consistent with 
many observations that leading indicators such as consumer sentiment indices or certain 
financial variables lead output by a few quarters on average. 
 
(d) Discussion 
      The finding that the uncertainty and the time preference rate in Japan increased significantly 
a few quarters before the beginning of the protracted slump in Japan suggests plausibility of the 
hypothesis that the slump in Japan was generated by the mechanism expressed in the new 
endogenous time preference model described in this paper. Of course, those results do not mean 
that the hypothesis is proved. The case of Japan is only one episode, and hence to prove the 
hypothesis many other episodes need to be examined and compared with each other. Reliability 
of the estimated time series of the time preference rate is another problem. They are merely 
“residuals,” thus it will be arguable how to interpret the residuals and whether it really reflects 
the true time preference rate, in the same way as estimated TFP and technology shocks do. 
                                                           
18  The null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected, thus the tests are performed by equation (9).  25
However, since the uncertainty and the time preference rate in Japan are estimated to have 
increased as predicted by the endogenous time preference model in this paper, this possibility 
should not be ignored and deserves more detailed examination. 
   Based on the endogenous time preference model in this paper, the following scenario may 
be possible: in the final days of the big boom of the 1980s, people began to anticipate more 
uncertainty in the future Japanese economy and as a result an approximately 2% upward shift of 
the time preference rate occurred during the fourth quarter of 1989. One quarter later, the equity 
market responded sensitively to the shift and dramatically changed course.
19 Next, other 
economic activities started responding to this new regime with the new time preference, and the 
real GDP turned the tide during the third quarter of 1990. The uncertainty and the time 
preference rate remained high even after monetary policy was dramatically changed to usher in 
unprecedentedly low interest rates, and thus the sluggish economy persisted. 
   Output fluctuations sharing the same kinds of characteristics as seen in the recent Japanese 
economy may have occurred before in other countries, and those fluctuations may not be 
exceptional or irrational episodes, but rather caused by shifts of time preference. The intuitive 
understanding that an economy is basically governed by the public’s psychology or “animal 
spirits” has been mentioned often. This paper suggests the possibility that one factor that may 
influence economic activities is the psychological response that causes the rate of time 
preference to shift.
20 
                                                           
19 Concerning equity prices in the U.S., Heaton and Lucus (1999), Fama and French (2001), and others have 
suggested a possibility that the lowered required return—that is, the run-up in equity values—in the 1990s in the U.S. 
was a reflection of a downward shift of the time discount factor. 
20 This argument suggests an answer to an unresolved question of why consumer sentiment indexes lead real 
economic activities. For example, when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the consumer sentiment indices in the U.S. 
dropped sharply and remained low during the Gulf War, and then the U.S. economy took a downturn and was in 
recession during the period. However, what caused this is still a puzzle. It may be possible to hypothesize that there 
was an upward shift of the time preference rate triggered by the intensified uncertainty about the future due to the war,  26
 
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
      Although the rate of time preference has been seen as an endogenous parameter since the era 
of Böhm-Bawerk (1889) and Fisher (1930), the existing endogenous time preference model 
since Uzawa (1968) has not been viewed as an appropriate expression of endogeniety of time 
preference because it has the serious shortcoming of the assumption θ’ > 0. This paper explored 
a new, intuitively acceptable and desired model of endogenous time preference that overcomes 
the necessity of the no-more-compelling assumption θ’ > 0. The key element of the new model 
is the more properly defined “size of utility stream,” by which the rate of time preference is 
influenced. The “size” is defined in the new model as a simple measure where entire utilities 
from the present to the distant future are summed up with equal weight. This definition is shown 
to be realistic and reasonable, and most importantly it leads to a stable endogenous time 
preference model successfully incorporating the assumption θ’ < 0. It should be stressed that, to 
the best of my knowledge, the endogenous time preference model presented in this paper is the 
first model that is both stable and compatible with the plausible and widely accepted conjecture 
that expected higher future consumption decreases the rate of time preference.     
   Furthermore, the new model predicts that an increase in uncertainty raises the rate of time 
preference in general and consequently inflicts negative and protracted impacts on real 
economic activities. It has often been asserted that in general the certainty equivalence holds 
and hence uncertainty has little influence on real economic activities, although intuitively future 
uncertainty appears to have significant influence on them. The model in this paper presents a 
new view of the causal link between uncertainty and real economic activities. 
   The subjective interest of this paper is the puzzle of why Japan has been mired in a 
protracted slump since the early 1990s. The ordinarily supposed driving forces of the business 
                                                                                                                                                                          
and the shift first came to the surface as the drop of the consumer sentiment indices and then resulted in the recession.  27
cycle, such as technology shocks, leisure preference shocks, monetary policy shocks, and 
indeterminacy are not all thought to have sufficient power to fully explain the persistent slump 
in Japan since the early 1990s. Hence, it is necessary to search for a suspect among the factors 
that are not usually considered to be driving forces of the business cycle. The rate of time 
preference and uncertainty are among those few factors. 
   The new endogenous time preference model in this paper was applied to this puzzle. The 
estimate shows that a time preference rate shift actually happened in Japan in the form of an 
upward shift of roughly 2%. The volatility of stock prices that is assumed to be a proxy of the 
uncertainty about the future economic situation was also estimated to have shifted substantially 
upward during the same period as the shift of the time preference rate, leading to a shift of the 
growth rate of the output three quarters later. These results support this paper’s hypothesis on 
the most probable causes of the economic fluctuation in Japan since the 1980s. The episode of 
the Japanese economy is so well fitted to the predicted consequence of an upward time 
preference shift driven by an increase of uncertainty that its implications seem worth pursuing. 28
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Table: Date of shifts 
================================================================== 
                    m e a n - W a l d      e x p - W a l d      s u p - W a l d      S h i f t   d a t e    
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Time  preference  rate    4.64***      19.48***      45.91***      1989  IVQ 
 
Volatility  of  TOPIX(1)  2.60*         2.35**       11.15**       1989  December 
 
Volatility  of  TOPIX(2)  3.72**        5.51***      19.00***      1989  December 
 
Real  GDP  per  capita    3.64**        3.57**       12.43**       1990  IIIQ 
================================================================== 
Note:1. ***, ** and * denote respectively statistical significance at 1 %, 5% and 10%. I used critical 
values in case of λ*=0.01 presented in Vogelsang (1997) for more stricter alternative values like: for 
P=1, at 1 %(6.64), at 2.5 %(5.36) and at 5 %(4.42) in mean-Wald, at 1 %(5.24), at 2.5 %(4.18) and at 
5 %(3.52) in exp-Wald and at 1 %(19.90), at 2.5 %(17.26) and at 5 %(15.44) in sup-Wald; for P=0 case, 
at 1 %(4.21), at 2.5 %(3.34) and at 5 %(2.66) in mean-Wald, at 1 %(3.63), at 2.5 %(2.80) and at 
5 %(2.20) in exp-Wald and at 1 %(14.49), at 2.5 %(12.46) and at 5 %(10.85) in sup-Wald. 
        2. Estimated by OLS. The test for the time preference is performed during the periods from 1986 IQ 
to 1995 IVQ. The test for the volatility of TOPIX(1) and (2) are performed during the periods from 
January 1980 to December 2001 and from June 1949 to December 2001 respectively. The test of the 
























































Figure 2: Effects of the size of utility stream on time preference rate 
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Figure 3: Effects of a time preference shift 
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Figure 5: The volatility of the TOPIX composite stock price index
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